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1. Introduction:  The Badminton project and WP 4  
The Badminton project (Bycatch and discards: Management INdicators, Trends and locatiON) aims at 
developing the knowledge of discarding patterns and factors in European fisheries, evaluating the efficacy 
of selective devices and other discard management measures that have been implemented in the past and 
finally improving methods to analyse, monitor and manage bycatch and discards in European fisheries. The 
term bycatch is not clear defined as noted by Alvarson et. Al (1994). In line with this we see bycatch as the 
non-target catch, meaning the incidental catch (which are retained) and the discard. Especially the discard 
fraction of the bycatch can be a problem in economic and environmental terms. 
One objective of the project is to provide estimates of the amounts discarded in selected European 
fisheries, which have been finalised by work package 1 (WP 1). WP 2 has the object to develop indicators of 
the total catch, discards and selectivity on the stock, community and fleet levels. WP 3 and 4 together have 
the objective to find the most important factors that determine the amounts of discards, including 
ecological, social, economic and technical factors. WP 3 will focus on environmental, technical and 
economic factors, mainly based on statistical data. WP 4 is supposed to focus on socio-economic and 
institutional factors for discards, with a central emphasis on qualitative data. The last objective of the 
project is to suggest integrated management approaches to the discard issue, which is addressed by WP 5. 
WP 4, thus, can base the work on results from the previous WPs and should provide information to the 
integrated management approaches proposed in last work package.  
WP4 focuses on the socio-economic and institutional factors that influence the amounts of discards. The 
purpose is to qualify the assessments of discard amounts and to achieve a better understanding of the 
importance of these factors in the development of management approaches which eventually will lead to a 
reduction in the amounts of discards. More specifically, there will be three case studies in WP 4 - in quite 
different settings regarding geography, culture and management. The factors of importance for discards 
are identified in each case with the purpose to generate more general patterns of important factors. The 
general pattern will be an input to the development of integrated management approaches.  
The purpose of the working paper is twofold:  1) To develop an understanding of how socio-economic and 
institutional incentives influence the fishers’ discard behaviours and 2) to outline the methods for studying 
the importance and specific appearance of the incentives during the case studies of WP 4.  
The first part of the paper describes the fishing process where decisions eventually leading to discards are 
made. The concepts of selectivity and discards will be described in this part. The second part is a theoretical 
basis for understanding how incentives and drivers (factors) influence the fishers’ behaviours. Based on this 
framework, the third part discusses how the theoretic elements could be represented when studying the 
discards of the fisheries. This leads to a table of the factors that potentially influence and drive the amounts 
of discards. These factors and their importance will be tested in the case studies. The fourth and final part 
of the paper discusses potential sources of data; it will especially discuss the method for gathering the 
qualitative data in the case studies.  
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1. Discards in the fishing process 
'Bycatch' and the following 'discarding' of (non-)target organisms are an integral part of global commercial 
fisheries. In this project, 'discards' are defined as the proportions of both target and non-target catches 
discharged back overboard, either 'live' or 'dead' (Rochet and Trenkel 2005). In the fishing process, the 
amount of non-target catch can be reduced by augmenting the selectivity in the fishing process; being 
more precise (selective) in the targeting of the wanted organisms. 
Discards are being dealt with in different ways across management systems. Some Nordic countries have 
prohibited discards, though with some modification. The EU has prohibited discards of fish for quota 
species, which can be landed legally, whereas it is legal to discard non-commercial fish and organisms and 
compulsory to discard fish, which cannot be landed legally (Johnsen and Eliasen 2011). In this regard, we 
discuss incentives within the framework of the EU regulation meaning that discards are not just an illegal 
activity.  
Independently of the legality of discarding organisms, understanding of the incentives to discard is 
important for at least two reasons. The first reason is the need of assessing the amount of discards for 
estimating the impact on species, populations and ecosystems. These assessments are important 
background data for the recommendations of the total allowable catch (TAC). The second reason for 
understanding the incentives is the wish to reduce the discards by reducing catch of unwanted species and 
individuals. Based on different reasons various groups of stakeholders express concerns about the waste of 
resources in discarding (from the economic waste related to discards over the waste of human nutrition to 
generally seeing discards as a disturbance of the natural balances). Therefore the reduction of discards is a 
highly profiled political goal in the EU and at broader international levels (EU Commission 2007, Kelleher 
2005). Especially in the perspective of the reduction of discards selectivity is a central issue. 
To understand how the various factors influences the amounts of discards, we have to identify the choices 
in the fishing process which can lead to discards, both the day-to-day decisions (the fishing tactics) and the 
strategic long-term decisions (Christensen and Raakjær 2006). The discarding takes place in the sorting 
process on the vessels right after the catch has been taken on board. Section 1.2 addresses these very 
short-term tactical decisions regarding discarding or maintaining each caught fish. Section 1.1 addresses 
the conditions for this, both the tactical choices which are made right up to the trip (choice of gear, fishing 
place and time etc.) and the strategic choices (choice of vessel, investments in quotas and equipment). 
They are named choices for selective behaviour; Tactical and strategic decisions that augment the 
selectivity and thereby unwanted catch and discards. This is illustrated in figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Selective behaviour and discard in the fishing practice, own model.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Selective behaviour 
Selective behaviour is an activity with the purpose of reducing the amount of unwanted bycatch and 
thereby discards. The selective behaviour is an activity in the preparation of the fishery and the fishing 
process until the catch. This includes the long-term strategic choice of investment in the vessel etc., as well 
as shorter time tactical choices regarding the gear and the use of it and the choice of fishing time and place 
(Eliasen et al. 2008).  
The strategic choices included in the selective behaviour regard the long-term investments. The main 
investment regards the vessel, the type of vessel and the configuration e.g. the types of gear and processes 
it can handle. In regions where quotas can be traded, investments in quotas can be seen as a long-term 
investment in buying quotas for future use. Depending of the market structure, buying or selling quotas can 
also be part of the tactical behaviour to adjust the quota mix to actual catch.  
The choice of gear is a very important part of the selective behaviour regarding both choice of type of gear 
(trawl, net, longline etc.) and the configuration of this (mesh size, grids, pingers, hook size etc.). First of all, 
the choice of gear and configuration is conclusive for the attraction selectivity. This means the ability to 
attract the wanted species and sizes, or discourage the unwanted species and sizes. This could be by using 
pots for Nephrops, which have no or very little catch of bottom fish or by using pingers to scare away 
mammals in nets. The choice of specific gear will exclude the possibility (or the probability) of catching a 
number of non-target species, which could lead to discards. The gear’s contact selectivity relates to the fish, 
which are forced to get in contact with the gear. Some of these are caught and other individuals are 
allowed to escape the gear, depending on species and sizes. As an example contact selectivity in the trawl 
fishery is related to form and size of the trawl and meshes as well as eventual escape windows and grids 
(Catchpole and Revil 2008). But the use of gear also affects the contact selectivity; e.g. the effective mesh 
size of a trawl may change depending on the speed of the vessel, which is why the diamond mesh (less 
dependent of the strength of the pull to size) has been implemented.  
The fisher’s choice of fishing time and place is another factor, which influences the selectivity. In a dynamic 
environment as the sea, there are no simple ways to find the places (and periods) where the fishery can 
take place with no or very little catch of unwanted individuals. Where to find the wanted fish and the 
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specific composition of species and sizes differs over time. Though, over time the skipper gathers 
information about good (or bad) fishing places, often combined with information about other factors such 
as time of the year, previous and present weather conditions, even the level of daylight (sunshine/clouded) 
(Catchpole 2005). This is central knowledge for the experienced skipper, which is used for optimising the 
landings, but eventually it can also be used for avoiding unwanted catch if this element is recorded by the 
skipper. The time and place factor are reflected in management as closed areas on a permanent basis 
(marine protected areas), in certain periods of the year (e.g. in spawning periods) or temporarily closed 
areas based on fishers information about e.g. many young fish in a certain area, as seen in the Scottish 
fisheries (Scottish Government).  
Depending of the fisher’s/skipper’s ability to be selective in the strategic as well as the tactical choices, the 
specific catch will have more or less unwanted catch to be discarded after the catch is landed on the deck. 
1.2 Discards on the deck 
When the fishers have brought the whole catch aboard, it consists of the targeted individuals as well as 
other individuals, which the fisher might or might not want to maintain and land. In practice the decision of 
discarding or maintaining the fish often will be made within in a few seconds. But for analytical reasons, it 
can be seen as a series of decisions from the fish in the net to the final storage and landing, as illustrated in 
figure 2 below (Pascoe 1997 in Eliasen et. al 2008). The right part of the figure labels the types of factors 
influencing the decisions (bearing in mind some types of discards are legal or even compulsory according to 
the EU regulations).  
After the catch has reached the deck, the fisher will make decisions regarding discarding or maintaining and 
landing the fish based on various considerations, as described by Andersen (et al 2005) and Rochet and 
Trenkel (2005). 
 
- Is it legal to keep the fish according to the (EU) regulation? The legality of keeping the fish depends 
of the specific regulation of the fishery. Various factors can influence; minimum landing sizes (MLS), 
general conservation rules, quota rights for the vessel, the species mix in the haul etc.  
- Are there any commercial values of the fish? The commercially interesting individuals could be the 
targeted species in correct size or non-target species with commercial value. The non-commercial 
fish would be undersized individuals of the targeted species or species without commercial value. 
The non-commercial fish would normally be discarded. 
- A part of this decision regards the perceived value of the fish. High value fish will be kept, while 
some marketable but low value fish could be discarded in order to focus on the high value fish. The 
low value fish could be damaged fish, the lowest paid legally landed sizes (high grading) or other 
low priced species.  
- Finally, there could be physical limitations on what can be kept and landed. Limits in capacity and 
skills to handle the catch and capacity of storage can also lead to the discarding of the fish. The 
limits could be time and manpower to process and ice the catch within reasonable time or that the 
handling facilities are either too little storage space or absence of special treating facilities to 
specific species. In these cases it might be easier to discard this part from the beginning, although it 
could have been marketable. In this final step of decisions skills and technology for handling and 
storage are factors influencing the decisions.  
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Figure 2: Diagram of the principal decisions in the sorting process leading to discard or landing in a system 
with legal/compulsory discards (based on Eliasen et. al 2008 P 38/ Pascoe 1997). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The discards depend on the degree of unwanted catch (the selectivity in planning and carrying out the 
fishing process) as well as the interrelation between regulations, markets, technology (gear and vessel 
characteristics) and the skills of the fishers (in the handling). Further one should be aware that the decisions 
are taken through a filter of the fishers perception of regulation, market signals etc. which differs between 
individuals as well as the situation. As an example Catchpole, Frida and Gray (2005) mentions that the 
Scottish fishers tend to retain whiting down to 27 (the MLS) if this is the target species, while only whitings 
down to 30 to 35 cm is retained if the target species is haddock or cod with larger MLS. The perception of 
the MLS of the specific species seems to depend of the MLS of the species caught in the same haul.  
 
 
2. Understanding behaviour in an institutional framework 
In the previous part, focus has been on the factors influencing the selectivity and discards and the fishers’ 
reactions on these in the form of choices in the planning of the fisheries and choices of maintaining or 
discarding parts of the catch. But how do the identified factors, and the incentives they represent influence 
the fishers’ behaviours eventually resulting in discards?  
The institutional theory offers tools for understanding how various incentives and institutions influence the 
individual behaviour. As Rudd (2004, P 112 ff) emphasises the individual behaviour is influenced by 
perceived incentives of various capitals; natural, manufactured (technology), human (knowledge) and social 
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capital. The latter, the social capital, is institutionalised as rules-in-use, e.g. formal rules and regulations as 
well as informal rules as norms and values for specific groups.  
These capitals are anchored in three settings; Community, State and Market characterised by different 
institutional orders (Apostle et al 1998). As ideal types the community is the lived-in human community 
based on interpersonal ties and egalitarian social networks governed by norms and values and social 
identification (Scott 1995). The State is based on formal institutions and structures of law, policy and 
governance, with specific regulations and decision-making procedures (technical and regulative measures), 
communication structures and formal control and enforcement systems. Finally the Market is characterised 
by competition, economic efficiency and (economic) rationality. In real world the three settings interacts 
and consist of different compositions of institutional orders ideally addressed to the other settings, as an 
example the market is an institution with own norms and rules to be followed in order to function (Scott 
1995).  
Apostle et al. (1998) argues that the fisheries develop in the triangle of Community, State and Market. 
Likewise we will argue that the behaviour of the individual should be understood as a result of factors from 
these three settings.   
Johnsen and Eliasen (2011) argue, in line with the previous, that an institutional approach should be taken 
to a complex problem as that of discards. They claim that to understand the conditions for fisheries 
management, the natural/ecological conditions should be included as an important element. The natural 
conditions are very dynamic, but external to the individual fisher as well as the institutional orders (State, 
Capital and Market), although these in the medium and long term can influence the natural conditions. In 
same way are the structural conditions, mainly in form of fixed capital invested in the vessels of the fleet, 
regarded as a given condition in the short run action (Christensen & Raakjær 2006). But in the long run the 
structural conditions are clearly determined by state, community and market.  
Figure 3: The model of the institutional embedded fishing practice. Fishing practise embedded in the 
Community, State, Market interrelation and the natural conditions. 
 
The model of the fishing practice in the institutional framework intents to grasp the institutional analysis at 
the operational level. The operational level is where the tactical decisions in the day-to-day operations are 
performed. The case studies on the analysis of incentives for discards will mainly focus on this level.  
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3. The appearance of the institutional settings in relation to discards and 
selectivity  
The model of the institutional embedded fishing practice should be further specified to be useful as a tool 
for analysing the factors possibly influencing the behaviour leading to the discards or selectivity. In the 
following we will specify the factors to be surveyed as possible factors in the selective/discard behaviour in 
the case studies.  
 
 
3.1 Natural and structural conditions influence at the fishing practice and 
discard 
The natural or the ecological conditions in the sea and the targeted fishery is important for selectivity and 
discard. There is generally a much lower discard level in fisheries targeting fish in schools than in fisheries 
targeting species in a mixed environment in regard species, size and year classes. Also the stock behaviour; 
natural variations in abundance, changes in position etc. influences unwanted catch and discard. Other 
natural conditions can influence; sea bed conditions (e.g. limits the use of gear types) or general weather 
conditions (e.g. waves can influence the functionality of the gear and the possibility of sorting and handling 
the fish aboard).  
Large sums of financial capital are fixed in investments in vessels, equipment and training in fishing in a 
certain way. In a short time perspective the fleet structure is therefor hard to change radically and can be 
regarded as a condition for the individual fisher and therefore a fixed condition for behaviour. 
 
 
3.2 Community influence at the fishing practice and discard 
The community is the first setting for institutional factors influencing fishing practice and discard. As such 
the community is the social setting which influences the fishing practice. In most situations this could more 
or less be seen as the norms and values of the lived-in community for the fisher as the fisheries generally is 
still located in more or less fishery dependent or dominated communities. In some situations though “the 
community” could be a subset of the lived-in community where fisheries are dominant or even a less 
geographic, more social defined community of a certain type of fishers, if this community – rather than the 
physical/geographical community - defines the values and norms in use in the fishery.  
As such the community are mainly the domain of values and norms, but also cognitive elements as 
categories, typifications and meanings. The norms and values are maintained by conformity, which creates 
relatively stable cultural elements and sets conditions for- and limits the individual choices and actions. The 
individual feels a belonging to one (or more) social groups. The group are constituted by a set of norms, 
values, morals and ethical standards, which the individual tends to follow to avoid social sanctions. The 
social sanctions may vary from remarks on improper behaviour from friends to the exclusion of the 
individual who does not follow the dominant norms in the group.  
The norms and values are generally historically based and slowly adjusted to fit the surroundings. In this 
way the norms represent past experiences in the group. These experiences are deducted from the specific 
situations and “sunken” to be the norm or “the way it is done”. In that way the sum of experiences is 
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generalised as knowledge within the group about how to do, it is institutionalised knowledge. Without 
being contrasted with other ways to do it, the norm is often tacit for those practising it. Nevertheless, in the 
cases studies there should be an establishment of the basic understanding of the norms and 
institutionalised knowledge related to the discard behaviours among the fishers, as this could influence the 
actual choices (as seen in Nielsen and Mathiesen 2003). 
While norms are generally sunken, categories, typifications and meanings are negotiated among the 
participants in an on-going and more reflected and cognitive process. In relation to the discards and 
(changed) selective behaviour, learning and redefinitions of the fishers’ roles and identities are central. 
The identity as fisher and especially the role in relation to the management system and extraction of nature 
influences the behaviour – the two extremes could be in the one end the fisher as the free extractor of the 
sea resources, delimited by the management and enforcement system, and in the other the fisher as an 
actor in a larger system with the aim of establishing an environmental and economic sustainable resource 
exploitation. As the role is under debate in many relations, one should be aware of the possibility of 
differences between the declared role and the performed role. Therefore in the study, the expressed roles 
should be registered as well as the role in practice.  
The fisher’s role in relation to the management system and the discard avoidance can be seen in practice in 
various ways e.g. in participation in dialogues with management, individual registration of discards in order 
to learn how to reduce these, collective learning and experience exchange with the purpose of reducing 
discards etc.  
 
 
3.3 The State and regulation influence at the fishing practice and discard 
The setting of the state is the domain of rules and laws. In this regard the overall policy framework is the 
Common Fisheries Policy. It sets the objectives of the policy, the regulations and specific technical 
measures as well as the rules for how these are decided and communicated.  
The regulations and technical measures limit the conditions for the individual fisher’s actions (the fishing 
activity). For the study of the cases it is important to understand the regulative conditions for the individual 
fisher/the group; who are allowed to fish (and eventually how the rights can be transferred), how are the 
limitations in the fishing activity implemented (the specific input and/or output regulation) and the 
supporting technical measures; specification of gear for the individual fishery, eventually permanent or 
temporary closing of areas, discard rules (prohibited/compulsory) etc.  
The decision making procedures regulate the fishers’ influences on the regulative outcome and the 
legitimacy of the regulations. This is highly important for the legitimacy of the regulations among the 
fishers, and probably also for the specific design of regulations and technical measures. Thus, in the case 
studies the formal procedures regarding the decision and design of the tool should be surveyed, as well as 
the fishers’ perception of the process.  
In this regard the specific communication structures between the fishers and the managers are important. 
These structures can carry information both ways; dialogues between fishers and management for 
designing useful technical measures as well as for communicating regulations for augmenting the 
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implementation. The communication structures are the formal and the informal forums where fishers and 
managers can meet and discuss experiences of discarding, effects of selective gear and measures etc. – 
advisory boards as well as dialogues during control sessions. The structures should be seen in a broad sense 
including the way the communication takes place; is it an open dialogue where problems and 
considerations can be exchanged or are a marking of positions and interests.  
Finally an important part is the control and enforcement procedures and implementations. Control and 
enforcement is the tool for securing regulations to be carried out. For most fishers this is the main interface 
to the regulative system. The efficiency of the enforcement of regulations influences the fishers’ incentives 
to follow the regulations, in this regard regulations influencing discards.  
 
 
3.4 Market influence at the fishing practice and discard 
The market can be seen as social structures (Scott 1995, p. 51), characterised by competition, economic 
efficiency and economic rationality. Within this setting, the economic incentives are important factors for 
fishing as an economic activity. For the individual fisher the markets and the conditions (what can be sold 
and which prices) are given (though often fluctuating) conditions within a short-time period. The existence 
(or absence) of a market is a main driver for the choice of fishing activity at all and therefore also important 
for choice of discards (Catchpole et al 2012). Also the patterns at the market reflecting prices for certain 
sizes, visible qualities (freshness, eventual marks etc.) as well as intangible qualities (sustainability of the 
fishing and processing, catch area etc.) might influence the discard choice.  
The available gear and vessel are a material and economic condition for the individual fisher and his tactical 
choices. The fisher is to a certain degree locked into a certain fishery due to his earlier strategic decisions 
regarding investments in the vessel and to a certain degree the gear (Christensen & Raakjær 2006). Radical 
shifts in the fishing methods (e.g. from trawl to net) can imply huge investments for rebuilding the vessel, 
which can be a barrier to quick changes in the fishing methods. Besides investments in the technology such 
shift also implies investment of time and capital in learning to use the new technology, which is often a long 
time consuming process, and possibly also social and economic transaction costs in redefinition of the type 
of fisher. Therefore the available vessel can be seen as a given condition for the fisher’s short-term tactical 
decisions. The existing equipment and gear also represent fixed capital, but in a minor scale. Therefore this 
can be seen as a field for action rather than a condition for action.  
The concrete factors of the institutional settings (and natural conditions), which might function as drivers 
for the discards/selective behaviour are listed in figure 4 below. These factors should be reflected in the 
case studies to ensure that possible important driving factors are not excluded.  
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Figure 4: Specified list of factors which might function as drivers for the discards and selective behaviours. 
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4. The data collection for the case studies – and the interview guide 
Each case has to be described to draw a picture of the fishing and thereby also the discard practice and 
selective behaviour. The factors developed in the model (the list in figure 4) should be examined in order to 
see if they function as a driver in regards to the discard and in such case how important this factor is.  
Some of the factors can be mapped based on existing data available in desk study: the scientific knowledge 
about the natural condition for the specific fishery (the mix of species and sizes and areas of appearance), 
the regulation of the fishery (the general mechanisms and specific measures for reducing the discards as 
gear specifications, closed areas etc.), and the general market conditions of the fishery. Further, the 
composition of the fleet and general use of the gear and fishing places can be registered to some extent. 
Besides the framework conditions, the desk research can further document (parts of) the behavioural 
outcome such as compliance (through registered violation of regulations) and registered discards (from 
observations and test fisheries) as well as information on local history, organisations etc. which contributes 
to the understanding of norms and cognitive institutions among the fishers.  
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Mapping data on these factors can point at some of the important drivers. But more qualitative methods 
should be used to understand the influence by most of the community factors as well as the perception of 
the state and market factors. In this regard we propose the use of semi-structured personal interviews. The 
interviews should describe the everyday life of the fisher, in which discards are a part. Through this 
description (and understanding) of the everyday practices an understanding of the elements of the factors 
can be illuminated. These elements are often more intangible and tacit, but can be interpreted from the 
everyday description and to some degree through observations of behaviour; attributes etc. during the 
interview visit (Schein 2004). 
 
 
4.1 Qualitative interviews 
We would like to obtain an understanding of the discards from the fishers’ perspective. This entails getting 
to know the fishers, their fisheries and their everyday challenges and appreciations. Hence, we prepare to 
conduct a number of semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews are conducted in a way that 
balances on one hand openness to the informant’s associations/answers and on the other hand an agenda 
for the overall topics of the interview. Methodologically, the guide for the interview can be based on 
Bernard’s ideas for semi-structured interviews (Bernard 1995) and Kvale’s writings on dynamic, positive 
interaction (Kvale 2004). 
Semi-structured interviews are based on tight-rope walking between on one hand openness to the 
informant’s associations from the questions – the informant can, through his answers; influence the 
directions of the interview. On the other hand, during the interview the interviewer has to ensure that the 
overall objectives and focuses of the interview guide are covered. Discards can be a sensitive topic for the 
fishers to discuss. In order to get the fishers to tell about their discards in detail, slow progress is needed. 
Ideally fishers should be revisited for interviews in order to obtain valid knowledge on discards, yet this is 
for practical reasons not an option. Hence we aim at positive and dynamic interaction instead. Positive and 
dynamic interaction, according to Kvale, is about translating the research questions into everyday questions 
in order to promote the informants’ motivations to tell about the topics behind the research questions 
instead of the just answering them shortly. 
Each interview is followed by an evaluation, e.g. considering the questions: 1) Which new information 
(concepts, reasoning etc.) did the interview provide? 2) Does any of this information open new perspectives 
in the answering of the overall research question? 3) How can the information be tested/broadened in later 
interviews? and 4) How does the new information fit into the information from previous interviews? In case 
this evaluation exposes gaps in the interviews or poses new unasked questions, the informants are 
contacted for further information. 
Qualitative research does not aim at being representative in a statistical sense (Kvale 2004; Wadel 1991; 
Spradley 1980). This does, however, not mean that any combination of informants would make a good 
sample to explore from. The interviewed informants have to be strategically chosen from relevant 
background variables such as: age, seniority in fisheries, number of days at sea per year, size of vessel, type 
of gear and participation in fisheries politics.  
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